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Confusion over sovereign immunity:  
What is Article II, Section 18 about?
By Anthony Johnstone*
Article II, Section 18 of the Montana Constitution (“State sub-
ject to suit”) says “[t]he state, counties, cities, towns, and all other 
local governmental entities shall have no immunity from suit for 
injury to a person or property, except as may be speciically pro-
vided by law by a two-thirds vote of each house of the legislature.” 
Lawyers commonly understand this provision to waive the state’s 
“sovereign immunity,” except when a supermajority of the legisla-
ture confers such immunity by statute. A case challenging the 2015 
Montana Legislature’s ratiication of a water rights compact with 
the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, Flathead Joint Board 
of Control v. State,1 presents an opportunity to clarify the various 
meanings of sovereign immunity in Montana law, and to conirm 
which forms of immunity the state constitution does, and does not, 
address.
Introduction
Two provisions of the compact and its associated administrative 
ordinance are at issue in the recent case because they purportedly 
grant the state sovereign immunity without the supermajority vote 
required by Article II, Section 18. First, the compact waives the 
tribes’ and the state’s jurisdictional “immunit[y] from suit, includ-
ing any defense the State shall have under the Eleventh Amendment 
of the Constitution of the United States … to permit the resolu-
tion of disputes under the Compact by the board.”2 Second, the 
ordinance establishes a joint water management board and confers 
upon its members and staf personal immunity “from suit for dam-
ages arising from the lawful discharge of an oicial duty associated 
with the carrying out of powers and duties set forth in the Compact 
or this Ordinance….”3 his latter provision is expressly severable 
from the rest of the law in case it is invalid.4
he state jurisdictional immunity in the compact, and the per-
sonal liability immunity in the ordinance, are each distinguishable 
from state liability “immunity from suit for injury to a person or 
property” addressed by Article II, Section 18. he compact waives 
the state’s constitutional jurisdictional immunity for enforcement 
1  No. DA 16-0516 (Mont.) (docketed Aug. 30, 2016).
2  Mont. Code Ann. § 85-20-1901(IV.I.8).
3  Mont. Code Ann. § 85-20-1902.1-2-111.
4  Mont. Code Ann. § 85-20-1902.1-1-113.
proceedings in state, federal, and tribal courts, and does not create 
any new tort liability immunity implicating Section 18. he ordi-
nance does not establish state immunity, but recognizes pre-existing 
common law personal immunities. hese varieties of “sovereign im-
munity” arise from separate sources of law and serve diferent pur-
poses. To understand how each immunity works, and where they 
stand in relation to each other and the state constitution, it helps to 
trace their origins in federal constitutional and state common law.
Sovereign immunity and related doctrines grew from roots in 
the common law long before Montana statehood. here are two 
main strands of immunities at play in claims brought against a state 
and its oicers. First, sovereign immunity protects a state from 
jurisdiction in a court without its consent, and from entity liability 
for damages in civil suits. It arises from principles of sovereignty in 
constitutional law, including popular sovereignty, under which the 
source of the law may not be subjected to the law. Second, personal 
immunity protects state oicers from personal liability for damages 
in civil suits for actions taken as state oicers. It arises from public 
policy concerns in tort law, under which a fear of civil suits may 
interfere with an oicer’s faithful execution of his duties. Personal 
immunity can be absolute depending on an oicer’s function, and 
can be qualiied depending on whether the oicer acted in good 
faith. he forms of sovereign immunity that come to Montana law 
through the Montana Constitution, the legislature, and judicial 
decisions draw on these various immunities.
I. Constitutional sovereign immunities can protect 
states from either jurisdiction, or liability, or both 
he concept of sovereign immunity arrived in the United 
States from English law, under which “no suit or action can be 
brought against the king … because no court can have jurisdic-
tion over him.”5 Such jurisdiction would imply a superior power 
of courts over the king, which is inconsistent with the supreme 
power of the king as sovereign.6 In the Federalist Papers, Alexander 
Hamilton assured the states that the ratiication of the United States 
Constitution would not alter the sovereign immunity “now enjoyed 
by the government of every State in the Union,” because “[i]t is 
inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit 
of an individual without its consent.”7 Sovereign immunity stands 
“on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right 
as against the authority that makes the law on which the right 
depends.”8 he implications of sovereign immunity include both 
5  1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 234-235 (1765).
6  Id.
7  The Federalist No. 81, p. 487 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (emphasis in 
original).
8  Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 416 (1979) (quoting Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 
U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (Holmes, J.)).
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jurisdictional and liability immunities.9
A. Federal sovereign immunity protects states from both 
jurisdiction and liability.
he question of whether the states consented to suit in federal 
court under the new Constitution soon arose in a case brought by a 
citizen of North Carolina against the State of Georgia.10 A major-
ity of justices in that case held that Georgia was subject to suit, 
relying on the text of Article III, Section 2 (“he judicial Power [of 
the United States] shall extend … to Controversies … between a 
State and Citizens of another State”),11 as well as new American 
principles of popular sovereignty (the people not their governments 
are sovereign).12 he states, apparently surprised at the Court’s con-
clusion, within two years ratiied the Eleventh Amendment: “he 
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend 
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one 
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State.”13 Although the Constitution speaks 
only to suits against states by citizens of other states, the Supreme 
Court now recognizes general state sovereign immunity against fed-
eral jurisdiction14 and most federal law regardless of the plaintifs’ 
state citizenship,15 except when expressly abrogated by Congress 
and the Constitution.16 he federal courts’ extension of sovereign 
immunity beyond the text of the Eleventh Amendment has drawn 
critics,17 but is well-established.
Sovereign immunity of states under federal law exists inde-
pendent of state law and is motivated by both jurisdictional and 
liability concerns. With respect to jurisdiction, sovereign immunity 
“prevent[s] the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process 
of judicial tribunal at the instance of private parties.”18 With respect 
to liability, sovereign immunity prevents a state from “the prospect 
of being thrust, by federal iat and against its will, into the disfavored 
status of a debtor, subject to the power of private citizens to levy 
9  Wood v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 826 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Mont. 2011) (“There 
are two forms of sovereign immunity: (1) sovereign immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment, which bars federal lawsuits against states and (2) sovereign immu-
nity under the broader doctrine of state sovereign immunity, which shields a state 
from liability in both federal and state court, unless it has consented to be sued.”).
10  See,  Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793).
11  See, e.g., Chisholm, 2 Dall. at 450-53 (opinion of Blair, J.).
12  See, e.g., Chisholm, 2 Dall. at 469-80 (opinion of Jay, C.J.); but see id. at 449 (Ire-
dell, J., dissenting) (“there are no principles of the old law, to which we must have 
recourse, that in any manner authorise the present suit, either by precedent or by 
analogy”).
13  U.S. Const., Amend. XI.
14  See, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996),
15  See, Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)
16  See, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (“the Eleventh Amendment, and 
the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the 
enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
17  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, “Closing the Courthouse Doors,” 71 Mont. L. Rev. 
285, 291 (arguing “the concept of sovereign immunity was inconsistent with the 
rule of law,” and the Eleventh Amendment only preserves narrow immunity for 
diversity jurisdiction); but see William Baude, Sovereign Immunity and the Consti-
tutional Text, 103 Va. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2017) (summarizing several defenses 
of state sovereign immunity, and ofering a novel defense of it as a common-law 
rule protected as a “constitutional backdrop”).
18  In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887) (“It was thought to be neither becoming 
nor convenient that the several States of the Union, invested with that large resid-
uum of sovereignty which had not been delegated to the United States, should be 
summoned as defendants to answer the complaints of private persons, whether 
citizens of other States or aliens, or that the course of their public policy and the 
administration of their public afairs should be subject to and controlled by the 
mandates of judicial tribunals without their consent, and in favor of individual in-
terests.”); see also, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996).
on its treasury or perhaps even government buildings or property 
which the State administers on the public’s behalf.”19 Consistent 
with these concerns, federal constitutional sovereign immunity has 
limits. States can consent to suit through powers originally del-
egated in the United States Constitution such as the federal judicial 
power of Article III and the congressional civil rights enforcement 
power of the Fourteenth Amendment, or through legislation or 
other oicial waiver of sovereign immunity from suit in state, fed-
eral, or tribal courts.20 Furthermore, state oicers acting on behalf of 
a state remain subject to suit in their oicial capacity for injunctive 
or declaratory relief, even when a judgment would have the efect 
of enjoining or declaring invalid the execution of state law.21 As de-
scribed below, sovereign immunity under federal law also does not 
prevent some damages claims against state oicers in their personal 
capacity, as long as the claim does not result in a judgment against 
the state treasury.22
A. Montana’s sovereign immunity also protects the state 
from both jurisdiction and liability.
Like the Eleventh Amendment, Montana’s original 1889 
Constitution addressed state sovereign immunity only indirectly. 
Prior to statehood, the territorial supreme court recognized 
sovereign immunity against a contract claim in 1868, holding, 
“unless permitted by some law of this Territory, or of the general 
government, no citizen of this Territory can sue it.”23 he statehood 
constitution assumed rather than expressed sovereign immunity 
in state courts, providing for a Board of Examiners to consider “all 
claims against the state” before the legislature acted upon them.24 As 
the Montana Supreme Court later put it, “the legislature found itself 
in the unpalatable position of acting as judge, jury, and responsible 
party in determining and settling such tort claims.”25 In 1963, the 
legislature limited sovereign immunity by deeming the purchase 
of liability insurance for either state or local governments to waive 
immunity to the extent of the insurance coverage.26 he Montana 
Supreme Court unanimously reairmed the doctrine on the eve of 
the 1972 Constitutional Convention, citing the legislature’s attempts 
to limit sovereign immunity as evidence of its continued existence.27
1. Article II, § 18 concerns only state liability immunity 
from tort damages.
For a brief period, Montana abolished a form of sovereign 
19  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999); see also, Hess v. Port Authority Trans-
Hudson Corporation, 513 US 30, 48-49 (1994).
20  See, U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 5. See also, Alden, 527 U.S. 
at 755; Lapides v. Board of Regents of Univ. System of Ga., 535 US 613, 622 (2002) 
(“This Court consistently has found a waiver when a State’s attorney general, 
authorized (as here) to bring a case in federal court, has voluntarily invoked that 
court’s jurisdiction.”).
21  See, Alden, 527 U.S. at 756-57; see also, Ex parte Young (209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908) 
(“the use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury 
of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one which does not 
afect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity.”).
22  See, Alden, 527 U.S. at 757; see also, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 US 651, 663 (1974) 
(“a suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from 
public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”).
23  Langford v. King, 1 Mont. 33, 38 (1868).
24  See, 1889 Mont. Const. Art. VII, § 20; cf. 1884 Mont. Const., Art. V, § 18.
25  Pfost v. State, 713 P.2d 495, 498 (Mont. 1985), overruled in part, Meech v. Hill-
haven West, Inc., 776 P. 2d 488, 491 (Mont. 1989).
26 See, An Act Prohibiting the Defense of Sovereign Immunity Where Public Bod-
ies are Insured, ch. 240, 1963 Mont. Laws 748 (codiied at § 40-4402, R.C.M. 1947).
27  See, Kaldahl v. State Hwy. Comm’n, 490 P.2d 220, 221 (1971) (“The legislature 
has spoken and we are bound by its enactments.”).
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immunity through its new 1972 Constitution.28 Several delegates 
introduced a proposed provision in the Declaration of Rights: “he 
State of Montana and its subdivisions shall be subject to the same 
liabilities as a natural person.”29 he Judiciary Committee referred 
the proposal to the Bill of Rights Committee.30 hat committee 
proposed “Non-Immunity from Suit” as new Section 18 to the 
Declaration of Rights:  “he state and its subdivisions shall have 
no special immunity from suit. his Provision shall apply only 
to causes of action arising ater June 1, 1973.”31 he committee 
report noted trends in citizen concern, legal scholarship, and 16 
state judiciaries that “the doctrine no longer has a rational justiica-
tion in law.”32 he committee’s conclusions found support in the 
inluential Bill of Rights study prepared for the delegates by Rick 
Applegate, who reviewed modern criticism of the ancient doctrine 
yet also noted the di culties presented by abolition.33 Indeed, the 
committee found sovereign immunity “repugnant to the funda-
mental premise of the American justice: all parties should receive 
fair and just redress whether the injuring party is a private citizen or 
a governmental agency.”34 
In the loor debate, the delegates focused on tort liability, despite 
expressing broader concerns about sovereign immunity. Delegate 
Marshall Murray introduced the proposal by explaining “the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity, which we are attempting to do 
away with by this particular provision, really means that the king 
can do whatever he wants but he doesn’t have to pay for it; and 
we’d like to do away with that doctrine.”35 Delegate Wade Dahood 
explained how the Supreme Court and legislature both seemed to 
defer to the other in hesitating to abolish sovereign immunity, even 
if “it’s an inalienable right to have remedy when someone injures 
you through negligence and through a wrongdoing, regardless of 
whether he has the status of a governmental servant or not.”36 As 
debate proceeded, Delegate Otto Habedank proposed, and the 
convention unanimously approved, a limit on the abolition’s scope 
to “suit for injury to a person or property,” which he understood to 
include tort actions, leaving the legislature “free to make [the immu-
nity waiver] more open if they desire to in the future.”37 Later, the 
Style and Drating Committee retitled the provision “State subject 
to suit,” and clariied the scope of “he State of Montana and its 
subdivisions” to include “he state, counties, cities, towns, and all 
28  See, Barry L. Hjort, “The Passing of Sovereign Immunity in Montana: The King 
is Dead!”, 34 Mont. L. Rev. 283, 288 (1973) (Illinois abolished sovereign immunity in 
its 1970 Constitution, but allowed the legislature to create exceptions).
29  Del. Prop. 30, I Mont. Const. Conv. 124 (Introduced Jan. 26, 1972).
30  Id. at 531.
31  Bill of Rights Cmmte. Rpt., II Mont. Const. Conv. 637 (Reported Feb. 23, 1972).
32  Id. at 637.
33  See, Rick Applegate, “Bill of Rights,” Mont. Const. Conv. Study No. 10, 289 (1971-
72).
34  II Mont. Const. Conv. at 637.
35  V Mont. Const. Conv. at 1760 (Verb. Trans. Mar. 8, 1972).
36  Id. at 1764; cf. Mont. Const., Art. II, § 16 (“Courts of justice shall be open to 
every person, and speedy remedy aforded for every injury of person, property, or 
character.”)
37  Id. at 1761. In narrowing the scope to tort liability, Delegate Habedank noted 
the waiver would not extend to other forms of liability like contract. See id. (“I think 
there are many instances where there may be some governmental employees 
[who] do some things in connection with contractual ields that we try to stick the 
government for where there is a good reason to maintain our governmental im-
munity in those situations.”)
other local governmental entities.”38 In retrospect, this clariication 
of the provision’s application to tort liability was fateful. It sacriiced 
the broader principle originally suggested by the text “no special im-
munity to suit,” in favor of a narrower right to recover tort damages 
from the state treasury.39 
he People of Montana ratiied the new Constitution, including 
the sovereign immunity provision, described as a “[n]ew provi-
sion abolishing the doctrine of sovereign immunity (‘the King can 
do no wrong’) and allowing any person to sue the state and local 
governments for injury caused by oicers and employees thereof.”40 
he legislature responded to the abolition of sovereign immunity 
with the Montana Comprehensive State Insurance Plan and Tort 
Claims Act.41 At the same time, critics speculated about the iscal 
and administrative impacts of governmental liability.42 In 1974, the 
Montana Legislature proposed, and the voters ratiied, the power 
to invoke sovereign immunity to state tort liability by legislative 
supermajorities.43 Professors Larry M. Elison and Fritz Snyder com-
ment, “[t]he people accepted the proposed change” to sovereign im-
munity in the ratiication of the 1972 Constitution, but “[e]fective 
lobbying by tradition-bound politicians and frightened government 
employees quickly reversed the change.44 Still, they did so through 
ratiication by 55 percent of voters at the 1974 general election.45 
he ballot language for the amendment explained, “[p]resently the 
Constitution of Montana provides that the state, counties, cities, 
towns, and all other local governmental entities shall have no im-
munity from suit for injury to person or property. his amendment 
would allow speciic exceptions to the waiver of sovereign immu-
nity by a two-thirds vote of each house of the legislature.”46 he 
provision now reads, as amended: 
Section 18. State subject to suit. he state, 
counties, cities, towns, and all other local 
governmental entities shall have no immunity 
from suit for injury to a person or property, 
except as may be speciically provided by law by 
a 2/3 vote of each house of the legislature. [his 
provision shall apply only to causes of action 
arising ater July 1, 1973.]
hus, sovereign immunity, which once arose only in common-
law judicial decisions, gained express constitutional status in a 
38  VII Mont. Const. Conv. at 2503 (Verb. Trans. Mar. 16, 1972).
39  As Delegate Habedank explained: “Limited as it is, for injury to a person or 
property, the Legislature is still free to make it more open if they desire to do so in 
the future. But we at least have assured the people of the State of Montana that 
they can sue for negligent injury.” V Mont. Const. Conv. at 1761 (Verb. Trans. Mar. 
8, 1972).
40  Prop. 1972 Const. for the State of Montana: Oicial Text with Explanation (1972), 
available at http://sos.mt.gov/Elections/Archives/1970s/1972/1972_VIP.pdf. 
41  Ch. 380, 1973 Mont. Laws, (codiied at Mont. Code Ann. §§ 2-9-101, et seq).
42  See, Hjort, 34 Mont. L. Rev. at 297 (“If left unchanged, Article II, § 18 portends, 
at best, an uncomfortable uncertainty. At worst, the spectre of disaster.”)
43  See, Sen. J. Res. 64, 1974 Mont. Laws 1610, Const. Amend. No. 2 (approved Nov. 
5, 1974).
44  Larry M. Elison & Fritz Snyder, The Montana State Constitution: A Reference 
Guide 64 (Greenwood Press 2001).
45  Mont. Sec’y of State, “Amendments to the 1972 Montana Constitution,” avail-
able at http://sos.mt.gov/Elections/Ballot_Issues/documents/Constitutional-Ballot-
Issues-1972-Current.pdf.
46  Voters’ Info. Pamphlet on Prop. Amend. C-2 (1974), available at http://sos.
mt.gov/Elections/Archives/1970s/1974/1974_VIP.pdf.
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backlash against an attempt to abolish it. 
2. Article II, § 18 does not afect other forms of liability 
immunity, or jurisdictional immunity.
Montana courts generally read Article II, Section 18 consistent 
with its text and history to focus on tort liability against the state 
itself.47 he legislature recognizes an arguably broader waiver in 
statute, including both state tort liability and liability for torts “of 
its employees acting within the scope of their employment or du-
ties whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function 
except as speciically provided by the legislature under Article II, 
Section 18, of he Constitution of the State of Montana.”48 he 
legislature also acted to provide immunity from exemplary and 
punitive damages,49 and capped governmental liability for tort 
damages.50 
Alongside its assumption of liability for oicers acting within the 
scope of their duties, the legislature enacted several forms of what 
might more accurately be termed personal immunities for legisla-
tive, judicial, and certain quasi-legislative executive decisions.51 
hese provisions immunize not just the state when sued as an en-
tity, but also immunize state employees when sued in their personal 
capacities.52 Relatedly, the legislature “provide[s] for the immuniza-
tion, defense, and indemniication of public oicers and employees 
civilly sued for their actions taken within the course and scope of 
their employment.”53 his immunization and indemniication of 
state oicers in their personal capacities exceeds the traditional 
scope of sovereign immunity under federal law, at least to the extent 
the personal capacity claims do not clearly seek damages from the 
public treasury.54
he remaining jurisdictional and liability immunity outside 
of tort claims is not diminished by the Montana Constitution, or 
subject to Article II, Section 18. Beyond the scope of that provision’s 
tort immunity waiver, the general rule of sovereign immunity 
applies: “a state cannot be sued in its own courts without its plain 
and speciic consent to suit either by constitutional provision or 
47  Peretti v. State, 777 P. 2d 329, 332 (Mont. 1989) (“the waiver found in Art. II, sec. 
18 extends only to tort actions, and not contract actions, involving injuries to a 
person or property”).
48  Mont. Code Ann. § 2-9-102.
49  See, Mont. Code Ann. § 2-9-105.
50  See, Mont. Code Ann. § 2-9-108.
51  See, Mont. Code Ann. §§ 2-9-111 (Immunity from suit for legislative acts and 
omissions), -112 (Immunity from suit for judicial acts and omissions), -113 (Im-
munity from suit for certain gubernatorial actions), & -114 (Immunity from suit for 
certain actions by local elected executives).
52  See, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. § 2-9-112 (“A member, oicer, or agent of the ju-
diciary is immune from suit for damages arising from the lawful discharge of an 
oicial duty associated with judicial actions of the court.”).
53  Mont. Code Ann. § 2-9-305(1).
54  See, Blaylock v. Schwinden, 862 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 1988) (in claims seek-
ing indemniication under Mont. Code Ann. § 2-9-305, holding “The eleventh 
amendment does not wholly bar plaintifs from federal court, however, because 
the complaint can be amended to claim only damages from the defendants in 
their individual capacities. A state indemniication statute does not automatically 
extend immunity to state oicials. Thus, the eleventh amendment does not bar 
plaintifs’ claim for damages against the defendants in their individual capacities.”) 
(citations and footnotes omitted); see, Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 
495 U.S. 299, 317 n. 10 (1990) (“It may be that a simple indemniication clause, 
without more, does not trigger the doctrine [of sovereign immunity]. Lower 
courts have uniformly held that states may not cloak their oicers with a personal 
Eleventh Amendment defense, by promising, by statute, to indemnify them for 
damages awards imposed on them for actions taken in the course of their employ-
ment.”).
by statute.”55 he state waives sovereign immunity and consents 
to suit on certain claims, including contract claims.56 Where there 
is no consent to suit, or where the state airmatively conirms im-
munity, however, the law recognizes the state’s sovereign immu-
nity untouched by the state constitution’s limited abolition of tort 
immunity.
II. Common-law personal immunity, not sovereign  
immunity, provides liability immunity to state oicials.
American courts adapted the doctrine of personal immunities 
from English common law. For example, the United States Supreme 
Court recognized judicial immunity as early as 1872 in a case arising 
from a trial of one of the alleged participants in President Abraham 
Lincoln’s assassination. In holding the trial judge immune from 
civil suit, the Court cited English law for the absolute immunity of 
a judge’s actions in his oicial capacity: “his provision of the law 
is not for the protection or beneit of a malicious or corrupt judge, 
but for the beneit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges 
should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence, 
and without fear of consequences.”57 A related “qualiied” immu-
nity developed in the common law where “absolute” immunity is 
unavailable, yet oicers act in good faith pursuit of the law. In these 
cases the Court recognizes that “the general costs of subjecting 
oicers to the risks of trial — distraction of oicials from their gov-
ernmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence 
of able people from public service,” outweigh the beneit of holding 
even careless public oicials liable for abuse of power.58 
Personal immunities are distinct from sovereign immunity, 
because they arise from public policy embedded in tort law rather 
than sovereignty principles recognized in constitutional law. As 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently 
summarized:
As a general matter, individual or “[p]ersonal-
capacity suits seek to impose personal liability 
upon a government oicial for [wrongful] actions 
he takes under color of . . . law,” and that were 
taken in the course of his oicial duties. Kentucky 
v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). By contrast, 
oicial capacity suits ultimately seek to hold the 
entity of which the oicer is an agent liable, rather 
than the oicial himself… For this reason, an 
oicer sued in his oicial capacity is entitled to 
“forms of sovereign immunity that the entity, qua 
entity, may possess.” Id. at 167. An oicer sued 
55  Peretti, 777 P. 2d at 332; see also, Wood v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 826 F. 
Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Mont. 2011) (holding a state agency is immune to a federal Fam-
ily and Medical Leave Act claim in federal court “because the State of Montana has 
not consented to be sued in state court under like circumstances,” outside of the 
scope of Article II, § 18). 
56  Mont. Code Ann. § 18-1-404.
57  Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 349 n. †† (1872); see also, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 
547, 553-54 (1967) (“Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law 
than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within 
their judicial jurisdiction”).
58  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 816 (1982). Like sovereign immunity, qualiied 
immunity is well established but criticized. See, e.g., William Baude, “Is Qualiied Im-
munity Unlawful?,” U. Chi. Pub. L. Working Paper No. 609 (Jan. 9, 2017), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2896508.  
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in his individual capacity, in contrast, although 
entitled to certain “personal immunity defenses, 
such as objectively reasonable reliance on existing 
law,” id. at 166-67, cannot claim sovereign 
immunity from suit, “so long as the relief is sought 
not from the [government] treasury but from the 
oicer personally.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 
757 (1999).59
hus, damages claims against the state as an entity are subject 
to sovereign immunity, conditional on compliance with Article II, 
Section 18 for tort liability. Damages claims against oicers may be 
subject to personal immunities, either absolute or qualiied.
Montana has adopted both forms of personal immunity, abso-
lute and qualiied, with its inheritance of the common law.60 State 
agencies and their oicers enjoy absolutequasi-judicial immunity 
from damages suits in their discretionary decisions to initiate and 
adjudicate administrative proceedings.61 Reiterating the English 
common law principle, the Montana Supreme Court has explained, 
“[l]ike judicial immunity, quasi-judicial immunity beneits the 
public—not the person being sued—by ensuring that quasi-judicial 
oicers exercise their functions unfettered by fear of legal con-
sequences; also like judicial immunity, quasi-judicial immunity 
extends only to acts within the scope of the actor’s jurisdiction and 
with the authorization of law.”62 Where this quasi-judicial immu-
nity does not apply, an additional layer of common law immunity is 
provided by qualiied immunity, which “operates to shield govern-
ment oicers performing discretionary functions from liability 
for civil damages when their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.”63
Montana courts consistently distinguish these common-law 
personal immunities of individuals from constitutional state sov-
ereign immunity, including the state’s immunity from tort liability 
59  Pistor v. Garcia, 791 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2015).
60  See,  Mont. Code Ann. § 1-1-108 (“In this state there is no common law in any 
case where the law is declared by statute. But where not so declared, if the same is 
applicable and of a general nature and not in conlict with the statutes, the com-
mon law shall be the law and rule of decision.”).
61  See,  Koppen v. Board of Medical Examiners, 759 P. 2d 173, 175-76 (Mont. 1988); 
but see,  Nelson v. State, 195 P.3d 293, 296-297 (Mont. 2008) (“Where the adminis-
trative function is mandated by statute and, thus, purely ministerial in nature, the 
administrative entity is not acting in a quasi-judicial manner and is not entitled to 
quasi-judicial immunity.”).
62  Steele v. McGregor, 956 P. 2d 1364, 1369 (Mont. 1998).
63  Rosenthal v. County of Madison, 170 P.3d 493, 500 (Mont. 2007).
addressed by Article II, Section 18. hese “are diferent concepts 
and are supported by diferent considerations of public policy,” 
the latter arising from ancient principles of sovereignty, the former 
arising from modern tort doctrine’s common-law adaptation to 
the ebb of those ancient principles as applied to public oicers.64 
hus, the “1972 Montana Constitution did not abolish prosecuto-
rial immunity,”65 or the related quasi-judicial immunity, as these 
immunities are “separate and distinct from sovereign immunity,” 
and therefore are “unafected by the language of Art. II, Sec. 18.”66 
Because of this distinction, and because “quasi-judicial immunity is 
not a subject of Montana statutory law,”67 there is no requirement 
for the legislature to act under the supermajority requirement of 
Article II, Section 18 for quasi-judicial immunity to protect state of-
icers otherwise subject to these common-law personal immunities.
Conclusion
Sovereign and personal immunities are a complex inheritance 
of both constitutional and common law. Article II, Section 18 of the 
Montana Constitution concerns only one strand of sovereign im-
munity doctrine, the tort liability of the state. Although there may 
be good arguments in law and justice for abolition, federal and state 
courts have long established the sovereign and personal immuni-
ties that were untouched by the state constitutional waiver of tort 
liability immunity. hese include the state’s jurisdictional immunity 
from suit without its consent, the state’s liability immunity from suit 
for damages outside tort, and state oicers’ liability immunity from 
suit for damages arising from their performance of oicial duties. 
Under established law, the state may conirm or waive these other 
judicially recognized immunities without consideration of Article 
II, Section 18 or its supermajority rule. In the water rights compact 
with the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, for example, the 
state waives its constitutional sovereign immunity from jurisdiction 
in federal or tribal court, and conirms certain oicers’ common-
law personal immunity from suit for damages. Recognition of 
these various sovereign and personal immunities, and their distinct 
sources and purposes, may help to clarify the resolution of legal 
problems that arise when a state and its oicers land in court.
64  State ex rel. Dept. of Justice v. District Court of Eighth Judicial Dist. In and For Cas-
cade County, 560 P.2d 1328, 1330 (Mont. 1977).
65  Id.
66  Koppen, 759 P.2d at 175; compare, Rahrer v. Board of Psychologists, 993 P.2d 680, 
684-685 (J. Nelson, specially concurring) (“In my view our creation of the doctrine 
of quasi-judicial immunity is in direct violation of Article II, Section 18 of the Mon-
tana Constitution which abolished governmental immunity from suit absent a 2/3 
vote of the legislature.”).
67  See,  Koppen, 759 P.2d at 175; see also, Rosenthal, 170 P.3d at 498 (“Although 
Article II, Section 18, of the 1972 Montana Constitution abolished the concept of 
‘sovereign immunity,’ we have stated that neither the Constitution nor the Mon-
tana Tort Claims Act abolished prosecutorial immunity” for quasi-judicial oicers).
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in his individual capacity, in contrast, although 
entitled to certain “personal immunity defenses, 
such as objectively reasonable reliance on existing 
law,” id. at 166-67, cannot claim sovereign 
immunity from suit, “so long as the relief is sought 
not from the [government] treasury but from the 
oicer personally.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 
757 (1999).59
hus, damages claims against the state as an entity are subject 
to sovereign immunity, conditional on compliance with Article II, 
Section 18 for tort liability. Damages claims against oicers may be 
subject to personal immunities, either absolute or qualiied.
Montana has adopted both forms of personal immunity, abso-
lute and qualiied, with its inheritance of the common law.60 State 
agencies and their oicers enjoy absolutequasi-judicial immunity 
from damages suits in their discretionary decisions to initiate and 
adjudicate administrative proceedings.61 Reiterating the English 
common law principle, the Montana Supreme Court has explained, 
“[l]ike judicial immunity, quasi-judicial immunity beneits the 
public—not the person being sued—by ensuring that quasi-judicial 
oicers exercise their functions unfettered by fear of legal con-
sequences; also like judicial immunity, quasi-judicial immunity 
extends only to acts within the scope of the actor’s jurisdiction and 
with the authorization of law.”62 Where this quasi-judicial immu-
nity does not apply, an additional layer of common law immunity is 
provided by qualiied immunity, which “operates to shield govern-
ment oicers performing discretionary functions from liability 
for civil damages when their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.”63
Montana courts consistently distinguish these common-law 
personal immunities of individuals from constitutional state sov-
ereign immunity, including the state’s immunity from tort liability 
59  Pistor v. Garcia, 791 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2015).
60  See,  Mont. Code Ann. § 1-1-108 (“In this state there is no common law in any 
case where the law is declared by statute. But where not so declared, if the same is 
applicable and of a general nature and not in conlict with the statutes, the com-
mon law shall be the law and rule of decision.”).
61  See,  Koppen v. Board of Medical Examiners, 759 P. 2d 173, 175-76 (Mont. 1988); 
but see,  Nelson v. State, 195 P.3d 293, 296-297 (Mont. 2008) (“Where the adminis-
trative function is mandated by statute and, thus, purely ministerial in nature, the 
administrative entity is not acting in a quasi-judicial manner and is not entitled to 
quasi-judicial immunity.”).
62  Steele v. McGregor, 956 P. 2d 1364, 1369 (Mont. 1998).
63  Rosenthal v. County of Madison, 170 P.3d 493, 500 (Mont. 2007).
addressed by Article II, Section 18. hese “are diferent concepts 
and are supported by diferent considerations of public policy,” 
the latter arising from ancient principles of sovereignty, the former 
arising from modern tort doctrine’s common-law adaptation to 
the ebb of those ancient principles as applied to public oicers.64 
hus, the “1972 Montana Constitution did not abolish prosecuto-
rial immunity,”65 or the related quasi-judicial immunity, as these 
immunities are “separate and distinct from sovereign immunity,” 
and therefore are “unafected by the language of Art. II, Sec. 18.”66 
Because of this distinction, and because “quasi-judicial immunity is 
not a subject of Montana statutory law,”67 there is no requirement 
for the legislature to act under the supermajority requirement of 
Article II, Section 18 for quasi-judicial immunity to protect state of-
icers otherwise subject to these common-law personal immunities.
Conclusion
Sovereign and personal immunities are a complex inheritance 
of both constitutional and common law. Article II, Section 18 of the 
Montana Constitution concerns only one strand of sovereign im-
munity doctrine, the tort liability of the state. Although there may 
be good arguments in law and justice for abolition, federal and state 
courts have long established the sovereign and personal immuni-
ties that were untouched by the state constitutional waiver of tort 
liability immunity. hese include the state’s jurisdictional immunity 
from suit without its consent, the state’s liability immunity from suit 
for damages outside tort, and state oicers’ liability immunity from 
suit for damages arising from their performance of oicial duties. 
Under established law, the state may conirm or waive these other 
judicially recognized immunities without consideration of Article 
II, Section 18 or its supermajority rule. In the water rights compact 
with the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, for example, the 
state waives its constitutional sovereign immunity from jurisdiction 
in federal or tribal court, and conirms certain oicers’ common-
law personal immunity from suit for damages. Recognition of 
these various sovereign and personal immunities, and their distinct 
sources and purposes, may help to clarify the resolution of legal 
problems that arise when a state and its oicers land in court.
64  State ex rel. Dept. of Justice v. District Court of Eighth Judicial Dist. In and For Cas-
cade County, 560 P.2d 1328, 1330 (Mont. 1977).
65  Id.
66  Koppen, 759 P.2d at 175; compare, Rahrer v. Board of Psychologists, 993 P.2d 680, 
684-685 (J. Nelson, specially concurring) (“In my view our creation of the doctrine 
of quasi-judicial immunity is in direct violation of Article II, Section 18 of the Mon-
tana Constitution which abolished governmental immunity from suit absent a 2/3 
vote of the legislature.”).
67  See,  Koppen, 759 P.2d at 175; see also, Rosenthal, 170 P.3d at 498 (“Although 
Article II, Section 18, of the 1972 Montana Constitution abolished the concept of 
‘sovereign immunity,’ we have stated that neither the Constitution nor the Mon-
tana Tort Claims Act abolished prosecutorial immunity” for quasi-judicial oicers).
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